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Allocation of locally generated electricity in
renewable energy communities
Miguel Manuel de Villena, Se´bastien Mathieu, Eric Vermeulen, Damien Ernst
Abstract—This paper introduces a methodology to perform
an ex-post allocation of locally generated electricity among the
members of a renewable energy community. Such an ex-post
allocation takes place in a settlement phase where the financial
exchanges of the community are based on the production and
consumption profiles of each member. The proposed methodology
consists of an optimisation framework which (i) minimises the
sum of individual electricity costs of the community members,
and (ii) can enforce minimum self-sufficiency rates –proportion
of electricity consumption covered by local production– on each
member, enhancing the economic gains of some of them. The
latter capability aims to ensure that members receive enough
incentives to participate in the renewable energy community. This
framework is designed so as to provide a practical approach that
is ready to use by community managers, which is compliant with
current legislation on renewable energy communities. It computes
a set of optimal repartition keys, which represent the percentage
of total local production given to each member – one key per
metering period per member. These keys are computed based
on an initial set of keys provided in the simulation, which are
typically contractual i.e., agreed upon between the member and
the manager the renewable energy community. This methodology
is tested in a broad range of scenarios, illustrating its ability to
optimise the operational costs of a renewable energy community.
Index Terms—Renewable energy communities, local electricity
production, repartition keys, distributed generation.
NOTATION
Sets
T Set of market periods {1, . . . , T}
I Set of REC members {1, . . . , I}
Parameters
At,i Initial allocation of production
Ct,i Consumption
Cnt,i Netted consumption
Kt,i Initial repartition keys
Pt,i Production
Pnt,i Netted production
SSRmini Minimum self-sufficiency rate
Xt,i Maximum allowed key deviation
ξbi Purchasing price imports
ξsi Selling price exports
ξl−i Local price imports
ξl+i Local price exports
ξdi Price of deviations from At,i
Decision variables
at,i Optimised allocated production
a+t Positive deviation from At,i
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a−t Negative deviation from At,i
kt,i Optimised repartition keys
ssri Coverage rate
vt,i Verified allocated production
yt,i Locally sold production
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE of the most widely accepted trends in the pathtoward the de-carbonisation of the electricity sector is
the decentralisation of electricity generation assets. This trend
challenges common practices in power system operations,
where consumer-centric electricity markets now play a key
role [1]. Among these new potential markets is the energy
community, naturally stemming from the empowerment of
final consumers which, according to [2], have made commu-
nity energy an effective and cost-efficient way to meet the
energy needs of citizens. An energy community is a consumer-
centric electricity market where several community members
may exchange, among themselves, electricity produced from
their own generation assets. According to some authors, the
main barrier to developing these communities is the lack of
sufficient legislation ensuring their viability [3], [4]. Aware of
this issue, regional, national, and supra-national authorities are
creating new legislations and frameworks that enable the emer-
gence of these energy communities. The European Parliament,
in the 2018/2001 directive [5], introduced a series of legal
notions such as the renewables self-consumer (or prosumer),
and the renewable energy community (REC). According to
this directive, all customers are eligible to participate in an
REC while maintaining their previous status as final customers
in a liberalised market, meaning that they are free to choose
their retailer. Since any customer is, according to this directive,
entitled to become prosumer, RECs may be composed of
consumers, prosumers, or generation assets owned by the
REC. In this context, RECs are managed by a central entity:
the energy community manager (ECM).
Following the latest regulation developments on RECs, the
main role of ECMs is to compute the allocation of locally
generated production among the REC members, and to com-
municate it to the distribution system operator (DSO) ex-post,
i.e., after physical delivery of electricity. This allocation of
local generation is computed by the ECM by means of what is
known as repartition keys. These keys represent the proportion
of available local electricity production –after-the-meter– that
is allocated to each of the REC members. After computing
these keys, the ECM communicates them to the DSO, which
modifies the meter readings of the REC members accordingly.
The electricity flows of each member are thus divided into two.
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The first one corresponds to the local production associated to
each member, which is used by the ECM to produce the local
electricity bill. The second one corresponds to the demand
that is not covered by local production, which is sent to the
members’ retailers to process the rest of the billing. Such a
concept is used by the French [6] and Walloon (region of
Belgium) regulation [7]. Moreover, other European countries
are adopting similar legislative decisions [8].
Using repartition keys to modify the meter readings of REC
members affects their self-sufficiency rates (SSRs). In this
context, SSR represents the proportion of total consumption
covered by local production, for each member. The fraction
of the total consumption not covered by local production
must be supplied by retailer contracts. The proportions of
consumption supplied locally (SSR) and by the retailer (100%
- SSR) have different prices associated. Both retailer and local
REC price comprise commodity, distribution, transmission
and taxes, however, as per current European regulations, the
DSO may offer a discount on the distribution component of
the local REC price. This is why maximising the use of
local production, that is, the SSR of the REC members, is
economically beneficial for them. Hence, computing the SSRs
of the members is crucial since it directly relates to their
economic gains for participating in an REC.
According to regulation, a contract between the ECM and
each REC member must be set, depending on which, the
repartition keys are computed. This computation is a two-
step process. First, an initial set of repartition keys are agreed
upon between both parties, by signing a contract. These
initial keys may be proportional to the investments of the
members on generation assets. Second, the actual repartition
keys are computed with some general objective, for instance
the minimisation of the electricity bills of REC members. The
deviations of the actual keys from the initial ones can be
limited by contract i.e., the actual keys might be forced to be
around the initial ones with a tolerance, for example, of 10%.
If no initial keys are set by the contract, or if the maximum
tolerance is 100%, the set of actual keys behave as though no
initial keys were set, simply optimising the general objective.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a method-
ology to compute actual repartition keys based on a set
of initial ones, allocating the local electricity generation of
an REC among its members, accordingly. This methodology
relies on an optimisation framework targeting a cost minimi-
sation which is ready to use by ECMs, offering the necessary
flexibility to be compliant with current regulations. In the rest
of the paper the actual keys are referred to as optimised keys.
After this introduction, Section II reviews the relevant liter-
ature on this topic. The repartition keys assignment problem
is stated in Section III. This problem is cast as a linear
optimisation program in Section IV. Section V demonstrates
and discusses the capabilities of this optimisation on different
use cases. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The current literature dealing with decentralised, consumer-
centric electricity trading can be broadly divided into two
groups: trading in a peer-to-peer (P2P) fashion and trading
through a central entity. A substantial amount of work has been
published on the former. Two literature reviews, [9] and [10],
present an overview of P2P markets. The first one explains
challenges and provides recommendations for these markets,
whereas the second one focuses on energy management using
game theory. A more recent work, [11], presents an assessment
of the behaviours of prosumers under a P2P paradigm. This
abundant literature, however, cannot be easily applied because
of the direction taken by current regulations, which define a
central planning entity, the ECM.
With regards to trading through a central planner, the liter-
ature is significantly less abundant and detailed, in particular
when it comes to describing consumer-centric markets such
as RECs. In [12], the authors present a community-based
approach to future electricity markets. An REC is presented
where the ECM acts as the interface between community
members and the market. In this community, members do
not interact with their retailers but rather with the ECM,
who has the ability to compute and offer electricity prices
to them. Another work, [13], introduces a benevolent planner
that maximises the welfare of the community, redistributing
revenues and costs among the REC members so that none
of them are penalised as a result of being in a community.
This problem is cast as a bi-level optimisation where the
lower level solves the clearing problem of the community
and the upper level shares the profits among the entities. In
[14], flexibility bids from flexible consumers in an REC are
offered to the ECM, who then selects and activates them to
increase the welfare of the community. An approach based
on game theory is presented in [1], where the authors present
an analysis on the viability of RECs. This paper stresses the
importance of correctly allocating the costs and benefits among
the participants, proposing a sharing rule of the gains based
on both local production and consumption, as opposed to only
production as it is usually done. The authors in [4] claim that
benefits for RECs stem from reductions on the network cost
as well as reductions on retailer costs, highlighting that proper
price schemes may lead to substantial savings.
Whilst these papers offer different approaches to managing
an REC, they all address the problem of scheduling the
electricity exchanges within the REC, and between the REC
and the grid, disregarding the settlement phase occurring after
physical delivery due, for instance, to forecast errors. This
paper aims to fill this gap, completing existing methods. Note
that the settlement proposed in this paper considers that the
customers maintain their contracts with their retailers, whereas
in the existing literature the ECM often provides all market
interactions, therefore acting as a retailer. Current regulation,
nonetheless, dictates for the ECM to be a mere facilitator of
the internal exchanges of an REC, without being a retailer [5].
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
To allocate the available local production injected into the
grid among the REC members, the presented methodology
must compute one repartition key per member and metering
period. The metering period is defined as the meter’s reso-
lution, e.g., 15 minutes. Repartition keys are computed with
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this resolution. These keys represent the proportion of local
production injected into the grid from which each member can
benefit, directly impacting on their SSRs. In addition to the
metering period, a reporting period can be defined, comprising
several metering periods. The presented methodology therefore
computes repartition keys for all metering periods in one
reporting period. Let T = {1, . . . , T} denote the set of all
metering periods in a reporting period where T is the reporting
period duration. Accordingly, the metering period is defined
by the intervals (t, t+ 1] contained in the reporting period T.
In addition, a set of I REC members is defined as I =
{1, . . . , I}. These members are characterised by their total
production (if any) and consumption profiles, given as time-
series with a resolution equal to the metering period, and
spanning the reporting period. Since REC members may be
prosumers, that is, they may consume or produce electricity
along the reporting period, their consumption per metering
period must be netted. This is done to subtract the behind-
the-meter production of these members. The consumption and
net consumption are denoted by Ct,i and Cnt,i, respectively.
Similarly, the production must be netted to account for any
behind-the-meter consumption. The production and net pro-
duction are denoted by Pt,i and Pnt,i, respectively.
Cnt,i = max {0, Ct,i − Pt,i} ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I, (1)
Pnt,i = max {0, Pt,i − Ct,i} ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I. (2)
Commonly, producers sell part of their netted production to
the community, which may not be able to consume it all. The
local production sold by REC member i at metering period
(t, t+ 1] is denoted as yt,i and bounded by Pnt,i: yt,i ≤ Pnt,i.
As stated in the introduction, the challenge of computing
repartition keys involves using a set of initial keys agreed
upon between the REC members and the ECM. These initial
keys are given by Kt,i, and represent the initial allocation of
the available local production (whatever it is). They are set
depending on the REC and the different agreements between
ECM and REC members. For instance, in the case of an REC
where the generation units are deployed thanks to an initial
investment of all REC members, the initial keys could be set
as the share of each member of the total investment of the
REC. If, on the other hand, there is no initial investment, the
initial keys may indicate the initial quantity of local production
promised by the ECM to the REC members.
In this context, this paper introduces a methodology to
compute an optimal set of repartition keys, represented by
kt,i, which are based on the initial ones. This computation of
optimal keys aims at minimising the sum of individual billing
electricity costs of the REC members, which are determined
by their electricity bill, expressed as:
Bt,i =ξ
b
i ·
(
Cnt,i − vt,i
)
+ ξl−i · vt,i−
ξl+i · yt,i − ξsi ·
(
Pnt,i − yt,i
) ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I, (3)
where ξbi is the overall price for electricity including distri-
bution, transmission, energy price, and taxes for member i;
and ξsi is the price at which member i sells any electricity
surplus to the retailer. Similarly, ξl−i is the electricity price
inside the REC, including taxes, local distribution (which may
also include a fee for the transmission system operator), and
energy price; and ξl+i is the selling price of electricity when
it is sold within the REC. Finally, vt,i represents the verified
allocated production, which is discussed later in this section.
To compute the optimal set of keys that leads to the
minimisation of Equation (3), the methodology takes into
account three sets of constraints. The first set relates to the
maximum allowed deviation of kt,i with respect to Kt,i.
Indeed, a tolerance around the initial set of contractual keys
Kt,i may be enforced, beyond which the optimal set of keys
kt,i cannot deviate. Such a tolerance is given by Xt,i:
Xt,i = |kt,i −Kt,i| ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I. (4)
The second set of constraints defines the meter readings as-
sociated to the optimal keys. First, with the initial keys and the
optimal ones, an initial allocation of available production and
an optimal allocation of available production are computed,
represented by At,i and at,i, respectively:
At,i = Kt,i ·
∑
i∈I
Pnt,i ∀t ∈ T, (5)
at,i = kt,i ·
∑
i∈I
Pnt,i ∀t ∈ T. (6)
The allocated production, however, is not necessarily the one
accepted by the DSO to correct the meter readings. For
instance, if the total net production (Pnt,i) is greater than
the total net consumption (Cnt,i), Equation (6) may lead to
allocations (at,i) that are, in fact, larger than the total net
consumption. To avoid such situations, a final check computes
the verified allocated production vt,i, which takes the value
of the optimal allocated production or the net consumption
depending on which one is smaller. In addition, the sum of
verified allocated production must be equal to the sum of local
production sold over the set I, for each metering period:
vt,i = min
{
at,i, C
n
t,i
} ∀ (t, i) ∈ T × I, (7)∑
i∈I
vt,i =
∑
i∈I
yt,i ∀t ∈ T. (8)
The final set of constraints is related to the SSRs of the REC
members, i.e. the fraction of the member’s net consumption
that is covered by local production. That is, covered consump-
tion divided by total consumption. The covered consumption
of member i is equal to the local production allocated to this
member, which is calculated as Pt,i − yt,i + vt,i. However,
since the allocated production may be greater than the total
consumption Ct,i, the covered consumption must be expressed
as min {Pt,i − yt,i + vt,i, Ct,i}. In this last expression, if
yt,i is positive, then Pt,i − yt,i + vt,i is greater or equal
than Ct,i, and therefore the expression can be simplified as
min {Pt,i + vt,i, Ct,i}. Consequently, the SSR of member i is
given by:
ssri =
∑
t∈Tmin {Pt,i + vt,i, Ct,i}∑
t∈T Ct,i
∀i ∈ I. (9)
Furthermore, a minimum SSR may be enforced so that the
ssri is increased for some REC members, enhancing their
economic gains. This constraint, nonetheless, can potentially
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increase the sum of the electricity bills of the members. An
SSRmini is thereby defined so that:
SSRmini ≤ ssri ∀i ∈ I. (10)
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The problem of allocating locally generated production by
means of repartition keys can be expressed as a linear program.
min
V ∈V
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
(Bt,i + ξ
d
i ·
(
a+t + a
−
t
)
) (11)
subject to
at,i = kt,i ·
∑
i∈I
Pnt,i ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (12)∑
i∈I
vt,i =
∑
i∈I
yt,i ∀t ∈ T (13)
yt,i ≤ Pnt,i ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (14)
at,i −At,i ≤ a+t ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (15)
At,i − at,i ≤ a−t ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (16)
vt,i ≤ at,i ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (17)
vt,i ≤ Cnt,i ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (18)∑
i∈I
kt,i ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ T (19)
kt,i −Kt,i ≤ Xt,i ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (20)
Kt,i − kt,i ≤ Xt,i ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (21)
SSRmini ≤
∑
t∈Tmin {Pt,i, Ct,i}+ vt,i∑
t∈T Ct,i
∀i ∈ I (22)
where the decision space of variables is V =(
kt,i, x
+
t,i, x
−
t,i, yt,i, at,i, vt,i, a
+
t , a
−
t , ssri
)
, with kt,i ∈ [0, 1]
and yt,i, at,i, vt,i, a+t , a
−
t , ssri ∈ R+.
The objective function (11) aims at minimising the sum
of electricity bills of the REC members (see Equation (3) in
Section III) as well as an additional term, which is introduced
to deal with cases with multiple solutions to the optimisation
problem. This may, for example, occur when the sum of the
net consumption of the members of the REC is greater than the
sum of the net production, and all members buy and sell energy
at the same price to both retailers and REC. In such a context,
this extra term favours a solution that distributes the local
production equally among the REC members, something we
believe is desirable. Without this term, the allocation in these
cases would be uneven, favouring some users depending on the
optimisation solver numerical preferences. The fictive costs ξdi
associated to this term must be low, e.g. less than 0.1e/MWh,
so that they will not lead to a solution that corresponds to
repartition keys associated with larger billing costs.
Equation (12) computes the optimised allocated production.
Equation (13) sets the total allocated production equal to the
total production sold by the REC members. Equation (14)
limits the production sold to the total available production.
Equations (15) and (16) compute the positive and negative
deviations of allocated production, respectively. Equations (17)
and (18) limit the verified allocated production to the smaller
value between allocated production and demand. Equation (19)
limits the sum of the repartition keys of the REC members
to 100%. Equations (20) and (21) compute the repartition
key deviations. Finally, Equation (22) computes the self-
sufficiency rate of every member and enforces a minimum
self-sufficiency rate. This last equation may lead to infeasible
solutions (by enforcing an unattainable SSRmini ), in which
case new SSRmini need to be defined by the ECM.
Note that the numerator of Equation (22) is a linear form of
the numerator of Equation (9). The two versions can be shown
to be equivalent. Focusing on the numerator in Equations (9)
and (22): If Pt,i > Ct,i, the net consumption Cnt,i is null, and
thereby vt,i = 0 as per Equation (18). In this case, the two
numerators become equal to min {Pt,i, Ct,i}. If Pt,i ≤ Ct,i,
the net consumption Cnt,i is not null, more precisely C
n
t,i ≥ 0,
and thereby vt,i ≥ 0. Then, by definition of vt,i:
vt,i ≤ Cnt,i = Ct,i − Pt,i (23)
Pt,i + vt,i ≤ Pt,i + Cnt,i = Ct,i. (24)
As Pt,i+ vt,i ≤ Ct,i, the numerator in Equation (9) becomes:
min {Pt,i + vt,i, Ct,i} = Pt,i + vt,i. (25)
which is equal to min {Pt,i, Ct,i}+ vt,i since Pt,i ≤ Ct,i.
V. RESULTS
This section introduces four different test cases as well
as a complexity analysis. The first and second test cases
illustrate the functioning of the methodology for different
time horizons and number of REC members. The third one
elaborates on the possibility to enforce a minimum SSR for
the REC members. The proposed methodology requires an
initial set of repartition keys from which an initial allocation
of production is determined. How to compute these initial
keys is the subject of debate, therefore, the last test case (iv)
analyses the impact of using different initial repartition keys.
Furthermore, it also tests the constraint enforcing maximum
repartition key deviations (Xt,i). In all test cases except for
the last one, the initial keys consist of a pro rata attribution
according to each member’s average consumption, as shown
in [1], [15]. The price signals are taken as ξbi = 220, ξ
s
i = 60,
ξl−i = 100, ξ
l+
i = 98 and ξ
d
i = 0.1 e/MWh.
A. Test case 1: performance on a simplified example
The first test case provides a simplified example to acquaint
the reader with the most important features of the tool. This
example features an REC with two pure consumers (User1
and User2, in red), one pure producer (User3, in green) and
one prosumer (User4, in orange). The optimisation horizon
is two metering periods, the first one with more production
than consumption, and the second with more consumption than
production. Table I presents the inputs used for this simulation
including: (i) consumption which is positive for consumption
and negative for production; (ii) initial keys; and (iii) initial
allocated production. Note that the units in this example are
kWh. All these parameters are computed as a pre-process of
the optimisation problem. By comparing the consumption and
initial allocated production in Table I, it can be seen that the
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initial allocation of production is suboptimal. For metering
period one, albeit there is more total production than total
consumption not all the REC members see their electricity
demand met, whereas for metering period two, the distribution
of the local production leads to spillage in User4 and to under-
supply in User1 and User2.
TABLE I: Test case 1 – inputs.
Metering period User1 User2 User3 User4
Consumption
2017-03-01 00:00 0.17 0.21 -0.50 0.08
2017-03-01 00:15 0.21 0.23 -0.30 -0.02
Initial repartition keys
2017-03-01 00:00 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.089
2017-03-01 00:15 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.089
Initial allocated production
2017-03-01 00:00 0.21 0.24 0.00 0.04
2017-03-01 00:15 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.03
This initial situation is then used by the optimisation prob-
lem to recompute the keys. The results of this optimisation are
presented in Table II. In this table, an overall re-arrangement
of the keys with respect to the initial ones can be observed.
At metering period one, the keys for User1 and User2 are
decreased, whereas the key of User4 is increased. Conversely,
at metering period two, the inverse flow occurs. The new set
of keys leads to an optimal allocation of the production among
the REC members by which any deficit of local production is
supplied by the retailers, whereas any excess is sold to them.
TABLE II: Test case1 – outputs.
Metering period User1 User2 User3 User4
Optimised repartition keys
2017-03-01 00:00 0.39 0.45 0.00 0.16
2017-03-01 00:15 0.47 0.53 0.00 0.00
Optimised verified allocated production
2017-03-01 00:00 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.08
2017-03-01 00:15 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.00
Production sold locally to the REC
2017-03-01 00:00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00
2017-03-01 00:15 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.02
Production sold to the main network
2017-03-01 00:00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
2017-03-01 00:15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Additionally, Table II shows the distribution of local produc-
tion: local sales (energy delivered to REC members) and global
sales (energy sold to the retailer). In the first metering period,
local sales amount to 0.46, which is the total demand of the
system. The production surplus (0.04), is sold to the retailer as
global sales. In the second metering period, local sales are 0.30
+ 0.02, which corresponds to the total available production.
Since, at this metering period, there is greater demand than
supply, there are no global sales. The maximisation of global
sales observed in these results depends on the price signals
imposed in the simulation. In this case, since the selling
price is the same for all producers, the optimisation cannot
discriminate between them when allocating local and global
sales, and provides one of the possible solutions. However,
this parameter can be adjusted in the optimisation (i.e. one
price signal per producer), leading to a ranking of producers.
B. Test case 2: performance on a realistic example
This second analysis introduces a more realistic set-up
where an REC with 23 net consumers and 1 net producer
is simulated over one year of operation. Input consumption
data corresponds to real measurements of small- and medium-
volume electricity consumers in Belgium. The initial reparti-
tion keys fed to the optimisation are based on a proportionality
principle of the annual consumption of the members with
respect to the total accumulated consumption of the REC. The
maximum key deviation Xt,i allowed is not bounded.
Figure 1 shows the electricity costs of all members with
and without participation in an REC after the optimisation of
the keys. In this figure, positive values imply a cost, whilst
negative values imply a revenue for the REC members. For
this set of prices, deploying an REC reduces the electricity
costs of the members by around 30% (some REC members
reach more than 50%).
Fig. 1: Costs of the REC members.
C. Test case 3: minimum SSR
The second test case showcases how the constraint imposing
a minimum SSR works. This analysis makes use of the same
REC and price signals as in the previous test case.
Figure 2 shows the SSR of the members of the REC,
after running the optimisation with SSRmini = 0% and
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(a) Without minimum SSR bound. (b) With an enforced minimum SSR of 42%
Fig. 2: SSR of the consumers after the repartition keys optimisation.
SSRmini = 42%. In this figure when no bound on the
SSRmini is imposed, the SSR of the members ssri is freely
selected to minimise the global costs of the REC. The values
of ssri span from 32.5% for User20 to 94.1% for User21
(see Figure 2a). As the problem is progressively tightened by
enforcing more restrictive values of SSRmini for all the REC
members, a transfer from the members with highest levels of
ssri to those with lower levels takes place. Upon reaching the
maximum feasible value of SSRmini = 42%, a more uniform
ssri for all REC members can be seen (see Subfigure 2b).
Note that for this example, enforcing an SSRmini greater than
42% leads to an infeasible problem where the system does
not generate sufficient local electricity to keep increasing it.
Tightening the optimisation problem may decrease the average
SSR of all members, since some members are forced to give
up part of their ssri to increase other members’ SSRs. In this
particular example, the consequence is that the average SSR of
the all REC members is eroded, decreasing from 58% to 56%.
However, the same does not apply to the SSR of the REC, as
this SSR only depends on the total local production, and this
does not change by enforcing tighter values of SSRmini .
Enforcing a minimum SSR has an impact on the electricity
costs of the REC members. Figure 3 illustrates the difference
in costs caused by the enforcement of SSRmini = 42%
compared to the case where it is left free (0.0%). This figure
shows that members who are forced to give up their ssri
when enforcing an SSRmini , incur higher costs than before
enforcing any SSRmini and conversely for the others. In
particular, the gains of REC members range from 0.25% for
User16 to 9.5% for User23, whereas the losses range from
−1.5% for User2 to −6.5% for User20.
D. Test case 4: impact of initial repartition keys
The last test case presented in this paper illustrates the im-
pact of employing different initial repartition keys. Moreover,
Fig. 3: Difference in the REC members costs, with and without
enforcing any minimum SSR of 42%.
it also showcases the functioning of the constraint imposing
a maximum key deviation. In this context, key deviations are
represented by the difference between optimised and initial
repartition keys of each REC member (kt,i−Kt,i). To perform
this analysis, a smaller REC is selected, composed of six
members: five net consumers (User1 – User5) and one net
producer (User6). The simulation horizon is reduced to one
month (April) because of the high number of runs required to
perform the following analyses.
This example tests different types of initial repartition keys:
• Uniform: evenly distributed among the REC members –
all members with positive net demand receive the same
percentage of the local production.
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• Proportional static: Each member obtains a percentage
of the local production which is proportional to their
average demand over the simulated period – each member
receives a different initial key, constant over time.
• Proportional dynamic: Each member obtains a percentage
of the available local production which is proportional
to their instantaneous demand – each member receives a
different initial key per metering period of the simulation.
Table III lists the total consumption and production of the
system and total allocated production achieved with the three
types of initial keys. With the proportional dynamic keys, the
local production is used up to 76% more than with uniform
keys, and 29% more than with proportional static keys.
TABLE III: Allocated production for the different initial keys.
Total demand 37.50 MWh
Total local production 11.35 MWh
Allocated production with uniform keys 5.02 MWh
Allocated production with proportional static keys 6.85 MWh
Allocated production with proportional dynamic keys 8.87 MWh
In the following, the evolution of several parameters over
a range of maximum allowed key deviations Xt,i given as
parameters, is shown. The allowed deviations span from 0%,
meaning that the optimised keys cannot deviate from the initial
keys, to 100%, meaning that the optimised keys may deviate as
much as needed, taking any value in [0, 1]. Since dynamic keys
lead to the most optimal distribution between local and global
sales as long as the price ξbi is the same for all members (i.e.,
same retailer contract), the sales do not change for different
values of Xt,i when these keys are implemented. For this
reason, the different parameter evolutions shown in the rest of
this section do not contain the impact of using dynamic keys.
This also indicates that dynamic keys are a suitable solution
when no other constraint is required, and purchasing prices ξbi
are similar across REC members.
The individual costs of the REC members, for a range
of Xt,i from 0% to 100%, are shown in Figure 4. All net
consumers (User1 – User5) see their costs reduced as the
maximum key deviation allowed becomes less restrictive. The
net producer (User6) electricity revenue increases as the costs
of the consumers decrease. In this case, positive values indicate
negative costs (or revenue), which increase by the given
percentage. The variation in member’s costs in response to
a relaxation of the maximum key deviation allowed results in
similar trends when using either uniform or proportional static
initial keys. The extent of these variations is different though,
being one order of magnitude larger for uniform keys. The
savings of User1 – User5 for uniform keys span from 1% to
8%, whereas for proportional static they span from 0.5% to
4%. The increase in gains of User6 is 16% with uniform keys
and 8% with static keys. These differences prove that uniform
initial keys lead to a highly suboptimal solution compared to
proportional static ones. This remark highlights the idea that
creating keys that are proportional to the demand of the REC
members seems to be a good practice, which concurs with
current practices [15].
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Fig. 4: Costs of the members for a range of maximum key
deviations (Xt,i) relative to the costs when Xt,i = 0.
A final analysis is presented in Figure 5, showing the
difference in allocated local production for different initial
keys and for a range of maximum allowed key deviations,
relative to the initial situation when no deviation is allowed. In
this last figure, the effect of relaxing the maximum allowed key
deviation is not shown for proportional dynamic keys since, as
in Figure 4, the changes are negligible. The trends followed by
the members’ allocated production is similar for uniform and
static keys. In both cases this trend is upward when relaxing
the value of maximum allowed key deviation. However, the
extent is different, and the members involved too: while in the
uniform keys case the allocated production increases for User1
and User4 to in excess of 100%, for static keys it only reaches
70% for User3. The difference in these results stems from the
different demand profiles of the REC members. For User3,
the average electricity demand is, on average, lower than for
the rest. Thus, when applying uniform keys, the allocated
production is sufficient to cover the demand of this member,
since the percentage of allocation is the same for all of them.
However, when applying proportional static keys, the initial
allocated production given to User3 is low – it depends on
average demand (which indeed is relatively low), but it has to
cover instantaneous demand (which might be high). For this
reason, the initial solution does not provide enough supply to
User3 with static keys, and therefore the methodology must
increase the optimised keys for this particular REC member.
E. Complexity analysis
In the final section of the results, we present an analysis of
the complexity of the methodology proposed. The number of
constraints of the optimisation is Ncons = 9|T||U|+ |T|+ |U|
and the number of variables Nvar = 17|T||U|+2|T|+ |U|. Ta-
ble IV introduces the running times for different complexities,
ranging from 15 days with 10 REC members to one month
with 100 members. The optimisation problem is implemented
with Pyomo in Python 3.8 and solved with the open source
solver CBC. Simulations are performed on a GNU/Linux
machine with an Intel Core i7-8665U and 16 Gb of RAM.
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Fig. 5: Allocated production of the REC members for a range
of maximum key deviations (Xt,i) relative to the allocated
production when Xt,i = 0.
TABLE IV: Running times of the proposed algorithm.
|T| |U| Ncons Nvar Build time [s] Solve time [s]
1,440 10 131,050 247,690 5.01 5.96
2,880 10 262,090 495,370 9.71 12.23
1,440 50 649,490 1,226,930 20.36 27.72
2,880 50 1,298,930 2,453,810 43.55 56.55
1,440 100 1,297,540 2,450,980 39.67 58.93
2,880 100 2,594,980 4,901,860 85.92 133.93
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a methodology to deal with the settle-
ment phase of an REC to optimise the sum of electricity bills
and to enforce minimum SSRs in some of the REC members
– a methodology that is compliant with current regulations
and ready to use by an ECM. After physical delivery of
electricity, the DSO permits modifying the meter readings.
This implies that the financial flows of the REC members can
be determined in a settlement phase that changes the meter
readings, and that splits these flows into two: one directed
to the ECM corresponding to electricity consumption within
the REC; and another sent to the retailers corresponding to
the electricity consumption covered by a traditional retailing
process. To modify the meter readings, this paper makes use
of repartition keys, which represent the percentage of total
local production provided to each member. The methodology
presented in this paper computes an ex-post allocation of local
production in an REC by using these keys. The repartition keys
are optimally computed by a linear program that minimises
the sum of individual electricity costs of the REC members,
and that may use an initial set of keys as starting point.
This methodology enables, by adding the right constraints,
the control of some parameters such as the self-sufficiency
rate of the REC members, or the deviations between optimised
repartition keys and initial ones.
Various test cases illustrate this methodology, testing the
functioning of the optimisation framework as well as its
parameters. Such tests show that this methodology results in
an allocation of local production that leads to lower opera-
tional costs than when no REC is established. Moreover, this
approach can be used to enforce minimum self-sufficiency
rates on the REC members, enhancing the economic gains of
some of them that might, otherwise, be left without sufficient
allocated production by a traditional global welfare optimi-
sation. Finally, simulation results indicate that using initial
keys consisting of a pro rata attribution of each REC member
instantaneous consumption is a good practice when the retail
electricity price of all of them is similar. The methodology
presented in this paper has been tested and is currently being
implemented by haulogy in different REC managed by them.
After discussing the settlement phase, a more comprehen-
sive standpoint where the control of the REC is also accounted
for is a potential way to expand our work. In addition, charges
based on peak power consumption that better reflect the costs
of withdrawing electricity from the distribution network might
be implemented in this framework.
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